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§ 1 ■ Introduction
In a stimulating article in the KYKLOS, John H. Makin 
discussed the important question of obtaining information about 
'the relative or absolute weights attached by policy makers to 
stated target variables' (Makin (1976) p. 709). His approach 
to the problem, following an empirical tradition richly referen­
ced in his article, was to investigate the identifiability con­
ditions of a 'reaction' function parametrized by the weights of 
a preference relation and linking, as variables, targets and 
instruments. Next, under the assumed identifiability conditions, 
standard econometric techniques were to be applied to derive 
estimates of the parameters.
He is, however, aware and candid enough to admit that serious 
difficulties beset the above approach due to 'the implicit assum­
ptions made .... that the policy-maker has a correct view of the 
impact of policy instruments upon targets' (Makin, op. cit., 
p. 724). Indeed, as he points out, some authors even go as far 
as rejecting the whole methodology of optimal policy derivation 
in view of the above implicit assumption (quite independently of 
the separate set of criticism levelled by the New Classical Macro­
economists!) As Makin observes - and here it is perhaps worth­
while quoting him in full - the difficulties implied by the above 
implicit assumption :
".... really points to the more fundamental problem of just 
how it is that the policy maker comes to obtain exogenous 
information on the reduced form coefficients in / the reac­
tion function/. Direct estimation is ruled out because the 
data has already been employed, with instruments in the role 
of endogenous variables and targets in the role of exogenous 




























































































termed the problem ... the 'conformity' concept and noted 
that trial and error may be necessary for policy makers to 
obtain perceived values of reduced form coefficients in the 
/coefficient matrix of the reaction function/ that are close 
to the true values".
(Makin, op. cit., p. 725, italics added)
In fact Ragnar Frisch in two of his very last publications 
was even more emphatic on the necessity for policy-makers to 
obtain such information (cf. Frisch (1972), 1981). His 'plea for 
a new type of cooperation between politicians and econometricians' 
so as to formalize 'the preference function which must underlie 
the very concept of an optimal economic policy' (Frisch, 1972, 
p. 5) seems to have been completely ignored. The method he envi­
saged was, to a large extent, similar to Tinbergen's advocacy of 
the 'trial and error' method - and indeed was an attempt to forma­
lize it as a convergent iterative process.
In this paper we attempt to tackle the problems Makin has 
noted along the lines suggested by Tinbergen and Frisch by forma­
lizing the cooperation between politicans and econometricians as 
an iterative - or trial and error - process such that the weights 
in the preference functions can be obtained in a finite number of 
steps.
§ 2. The Problem of Formalizing the Preference Function and an 
Iterative Solution to it.
a) General Remarks:
Given the description of an economy in the form of a stan­




























































































essentially, on the weighting of these targets and the constraints 
implied by the model. It is clear that only in the course of 
formulating and implementing policy decisions that policy makers 
obtain an increasingly concrete and accurate knowledge of what 
can be done. As a result of this, a realization of what is desir­
ed gains a sharper focus in the sense that the different targets 
would be reweighted in terms of each other ^ . If, therefore, 
the Frisch-Tinbergen suggestion is to be feasible, the real-time 
process of formulating and implementing policy decisions and then 
revising the relative importance to be attributed to targets in 
the light of realized values must be substituted by a conceptual,
albeit implementable, iterative process replicating the above
. . (2 )actions
There is, of course, no such thing as a 'best' set of weights 
independent of a 'best' desired path. In the context of optimal 
economic policy what is arrived at is a politically acceptable 
path for target variables - but optimally generated. Since, as 
Makin also notes (cf. Makin, op. cit., p. 727), it would be unrea­
listic to expect politicians and policy makers to directly reveal 
their priorities (even if they could!), an indirect approach would 
be not only desirable but imperative. Frisch's suggestion is that 
the trial and error process of real-time cognition of the relation­
ship between weights, instruments and targets should be substitu­
ted by the formalization of cooperation between policy makers and 
econometricians (model builders) such that the policy maker 
(unwittingly !) reveals his priorities. The cooperation itself 
is to take the form of the econometrician or model builder, for 
an assumed arbitrary (say, identical) set of weights, optimally 
solving for the target variables and confronting the policy maker 




























































































Once these initial 'optimal values' have been determined 
the method we outline below provides a systematic way in which 
the policy maker can state his dissatisfaction with the values 
of the various target variables and tell the model builder / 
econometrician how he would like it changed. ("I do not like 
such a high current account deficit - please, also note that I 
cannot carry my cabinet colleagues on such levels for the govern­
ment deficit"!!). This leaves the econometrician with the diffi­
cult - but, as we shall show, not impossible - task of reweight­
ing the targets such that a more (politically) acceptable set of 
values can be obtained. It must be noted that almost any state­
ment by the policy maker implies a relative weighting. The task 
is to formalize this implied set of weights. The amendments to 
the (optimal) values of the target variables (̂to make them more 
acceptable politically) are translated into corresponding corre- 
ctions to the weighting matrix . In the method of formalized 
cooperation that is described below an 'optimal' set of weights 
may be obtained by repeating the above procedure so that, at the 
end of this iterative procedure, the 'final' set of values for 
the target variables will be acceptable to the policy maker.
b) Formalization of the Problem;
Consider the problem introduced by Makin
min { J (Y, U) | (Y, U) £  R } (2.1)
where the objective function J is a quadratic given by
[y - Yd]
T


































































































with Q a symmetric positive definite matrix and the
feasible region R given by
R A {(Y, U) N
J
(2.3)
(corresponding to, for example, equations (1) and (2) in Makin 
(op. cit.), but in a more generalized form) with the matrix N 
denoting the model Jacobian. Without loss of generality, we
(6 )assume that the columns of N are linearly independent vectors
The vector Y denotes the endogenous variable vector and U deno-
(7)tes the vector of policy instruments
The superscript d on Y and U in (2.2) denotes values of Ÿ 
and U respectively which are desirable for the economic system.
However, Yd and Ud are not necessarily feasible. Indeed if
d d. d(Y , U ) 6 R» then (2.1) has the obvious solution Y^ = Y and
= Ud. It is when Yd, Ud ^  R that it becomes important for
the policy maker to specify the importance he attaches in Y^,
the ith element of Y, attaining its corresponding desired value 
d dY^ versus Y_. attaining Y_. . Similarly, the importance in
attaining U^d versus attaining U d needs to be specified.
Finally, the trade-off between Y. attaining Y.d and U attaining 
d has to be specified. All this preferance information is 
clearly summarized in the specification of the matrix Q in (2.2) 
which has a slightly generalized version of the structure adopt­
ed by Makin who has assumed that the trade-off between Y. attain
d d 1ing Y^ and attaining is zero. This amounts to assuming
that the corresponding off-diagonal submatrices of Q are zero.
The formulation (21.) is essentially a quadratic programm- 




























































































take account of linear terms in the quadratic objective function 
by a simple redefinition of desired values in (2.2). Consider 
the objective function












where Q is symmetric positive definite and e is a constant 
vector. The unconstrained minimum of (2.4) is given by
p- - - “u dY Y— —e• • • = . . •u dU u
- _ —e
with H = Q 1. From an inspection of first order optimality 
conditions, it can be seen that Y* , U* which solve
min {j (Y, U) e — — (Y, U) R > (2 .6 )
also solve (2.1) when the desired values in (2.2) are defined 
as
Thus, (2.6) can be straightforwardly expressed as (2.1) using 
(2.7) .
Given the desired values and the feasible region R, the 




























































































Specifically, Y, UTcan be written as :
Y* Y " T -1 , T Yd
U* *du
-
- H N (N HN) (N
7
- b) (2 .8 )
Let denote the set of admissable values of (Y, JJ) from the 
policy maker's point of view and let R be nonempty and
convex. Let denote the current weighting matrix in (2.2). 
The corresponding solution of (2,i), given by (2.8) with Q=Qc, 
will be called "the current optimal solution".
(Y*, U * ) -c —c (2.9)
After a careful inspection of the values in (2.9), the 
policy maker may decide that some of these values are not quite 
what he wants them to be. This means that
(Y*, U* ) 0  fi. —c — c
The policy makers' dissatisfaction, expressed in terms of 
qualitative information (i.e., inflation too high, interest rates 
too high from the point of view of "friendly" competitors, etc..) 
must now be translated into modifications of the weighting matrix 
This for at least two reasons : firstly because each such express 
ion of dissatisfaction, in general, implies an ordering or a 
reordering of priorities; secondly, given the feasible region 
R delineated a priori by the model equations, the only possibi­
lity for obtaining modified and more acceptable values for tar­




























































































Thus to obtain an optimal solution which the policy maker 
prefers to (2.9) is to alter some of the elements of Qc. The 
basic idea is to update to a new weighting matrix such 
that "the new optimal trajectory"
(Y*, U*), (2.10)-n —n
obtained by solving (2.1) with 0=0^, is also in ft. This is 
indicated in Figure 1 below. The simple conjecture that the 
new optimal solution may also not be completely satisfactory 
(i.e. not in ft) as a result of the first update of Q leads to 
an iterative updating procedure. After each update, the opti­
misation problem is solved using the new Q until a solution is 
obtained which is also in ft. The process of adjusting the weights 
may be repeated until a satisfactory analysis is made in order 





























































































c) On the Specification of the Policy Makers' Preferences:
Computationally the iterative procedure can be summarised 
as follows:
d dStep 0 : Given the derived trajectory Y , U assume some 
initial weighting Qc«
Step 1 : Using solve the minimisation problem (2.1) to
obtain Y*, .—c —c
Step 2 : Show Y*, U* to the policy maker. If Y*, ^  ft then
the problem is solved: stop. Otherwise, ask the policy maker
to specify the trajectory he prefers to Y*-, U*. This "preferred"c c
trajectory, denoted by
(YP, UP) (2.11)
incorporates all the corrections to Y^, such that (2.11) is 
preferable to the "current" optimal trajectory. An obvious 
property of (2.11) is that (YP, UP) 6: ft.
Step 3 : Use the "displacement" vector
" xp ' Y6 A — —c— up U^—c
to update and obtain
Q = Q + u u c
Q 6 6 Q c ---c
T6 Q 6 — c —




























































































Set Q = Q and go to Step 1. c u
Figure 2 below illustrates the iterative nature of the 
method. If the new optimal trajector is not quite in fl, the 
procedure of adjusting Q has to be repeated.
The fact that updating does indeed push Y*, U* towards 
Q, as depicted in Figure 2, is established in Rustem, Velupillai 
and Westcott (1978) along with numerical results. The extension 
of the method to general convex constraints is discussed in 
Rustem and Velupillai (1983).
It is clear then that given only preferred directions for 
key target variables and an element of consistency on the part 
of the policy maker (cf., for example, Sen (1970), p. 63), it 
is possible to translate this qualitative information into 
quantitative modification of the weights. The end result is 




























































































targets and instruments and indeed an awareness of the quanti­
tative magnitude of their interdependence.
§ 3. Concluding Notes .
Researchers using optimization techniques in policy studies 
seem not to have been sufficiently careful and critical in the 
specifications of the objective function for a policy maker. 
Achievement of the targets of macroeconomic policy depend 
crucially on the priorities attached to them. If these priori­
ties are misspecified, policy is suboptimal in a much more 
fundamental sense than the usual reasonings underlying 1 second- 
best' arguments. 'Second-best' arguments refer to the region 
made feasible or not by the model equations, i.e., in our nota­
tion R. However, more basic especially from a political econo­
mic point of view is the region defined by Q.
Starting from the problem posed by Markin and taking the 
hints provided by Frisch and Tinbergen we have attempted to 
tackle the problem of correctly specifying the region defined 
by (i.e., the weights in a criterion function). This was done 
by taking into account explicitly the interdependence between 
targets, instruments and weights by using the implicit informa­
tion given by a possible and implementable dialogue between a 
policy maker and a model builder. In this we have tried to 
remain as close as possible to the programme plea made by Frisch 
in his Nobel lecture.
At a less general and more technical level it must be poin­




























































































quadratic criterion function, in our context, lose much of 
its force (cf. Makin (op. cit p. 728, f.n. 18). The reason 
is simple. The quadratic criterion function is said to 
penalise deviation of the optimal solution from the desired 
direction as much as a deviation in an undesirable direction. 
Thus, for example, a deviation of the unemployment target 
from the desired level is penalised equally in either direct­
ion because of the symmetric nature of the quadratic criter­
ion function. However, the iterative nature of our method 
shows clearly that such cases are the result of a misspecifi- 
cation of the desired values. If an optimal trajectory is 
equal to or higher (in the desirable direction) than its 
corresponding desired value specified in generating the ori­
ginal solution, then at the next iteration a new optimisation 
criterion may be defined by resetting those desired values 
marginally higher than the current optimal values. Such 
respecification eventually ensures that all departures from 
the desired values of the key target variables are in undesi­
rable directions. This particular respecification is an 
element of the process of learning about the nature of the 
interdependence represented by the region R. Thus, the pro­
blems introduced by the symmetric nature of the quadratic 
criterion function should not be considered crucial within 
the context of an iterative scheme such as is represented 
above.
Recognizing that priorities attached to specific target 
variables in economic policy are crucial in determining the 
feasibility or not of policy instruments we have, in this pap­
er, attempted to provide a solution to one aspect of the prob­




























































































of these priorities. There remains, however, the more funda 
mental problem of Arrow impossibilities and the whole heavy­
weight of the criticisms launched by the New Classical Macro 
























































































































































































(1) cf. Kornai (1975), p. 420 for a related description of 
the problem in the context of planned economies.
(2) There is, of course, an analogy with the Walrasian tâtonne­
ment. cf. Goodwin (1952), pp. 59-60 and Patinkin (1965), p. 39, 
f.n. 8 and p. 532, f.n. 2.
(3) Technically, as will be seen below, the corresponding 
corrections are rank-one corrections.
(4) Nonsymmetric matrices are equally acceptable since in this 
case the optimization problem can be equivalently formulated 
using Q = ^(Q^g + QNS ) where QNg is the nonsymmetric matrix.
(5) The positive definiteness assumption on Q can be relaxed 
by considering instead of (Y, U) a set of variables in reduced 
dimension, transformed using the constraints. In effect this 
implies that Q needs to be positive definite only in the inter­
section of the constraints defining R. This overcomes diffi­
culties of having to include all elements of (Y, U) in the 
objective function.
(6) If some of the column vectors are linearly dependent on 
the others then there exist numerical procedures which detect 
this and consider only a linearly independent subset (see Gill 
and Murray, 1978; Rustem, 1981).





























































































Y = [ / (1), . yT (K)] T ; U = [hT (D » •••' uT (k)| T
for a k-period discrete-time optimization problem where 
y(i) , u(i) are the endogenous variables and policy instruments 
at time period i. The model equations (2.3),e.g. given by a 
standard econometric model, describing the region R can also 
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